Argumentos Desmanteladores Evolutivos e a Derrogabilidade do Conhecimento Moral.

Abstract

The main objective of this work is to analyze an epistemological problem that arises for the Evolutionary Debunkig Arguments: the demarcation problem. The Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are skeptical challenges addressed to moral knowledge, which have as their starting point the evolutionary view of morality, and which conclude that moral beliefs are unjustified. The demarcation problem, in turn, is a problem developed by Christos Kyriacou (2019) to Sharon Street’s (2006) and Richard Joyce’s (2006, 2013, 2016) Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (2006). According to Kyriacou (2019) the Evolutionary Debunking Arguments fall under the problem of demarcation because they do not clarify what is the metaepistemic principle that regulates information from natural selection, and establishes the skeptical conclusion of these arguments. In order to fulfill the central objective, however, it is necessary to comply with some secondary objectives. Thus, the first secondary objective of this work is to clarify what are the Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Thus, we consider that these arguments are skeptical challenges to moral knowledge, developed from the considerations of evolutionary theory applied to philosophy. The second secondary objective of this work follows from the first: to clarify the evolutionary vision of morality that serves as a starting point for the Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. After offering these initial clarifications, the present work is dedicated to analyzing two options for responding to the problem of demarcation: the Milvian Bridge Principle, proposed by Griffiths and Wilkins (2013, 2015) and the compatibility of the EDA with defeasibility theory, proposed by Machuca (2018), Luz (2018) and Korman (2019). The Milvian Bridge Principle will be rejected as a solution to the demarcation problem, based on Kyriacou's criticism (2016, 2017), which shows that this principle is self-refuting. Finally, we will analyze the proposals to make Evolutionary Debunking Arguments compatible with defeasibility theory, showing how the interpretation of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments as undercutting defeaters of moral knowledge leads to a strong solution to the demarcation problem.