Ética e condições de objetividade em Hilary Putnam

Abstract

Beginning from a reconstruction of part of the history of ethics, Hilary Putnam argues in favor that the complex relation between normativity and descriptions of the world suggests that these notions do not allow for an entirely separate treatment. Consequently, he rejects the conclusion, defended by logical positivists, that the discussion of ethical issues would fall outside the field of rational discussion, thereby taking an important step in the defense of ethical judgments discussed objectively. The thesis supported by this author that, in practice, there is a phenomenon of entanglement between facts and values opens the way for the possibility of a more flexible understanding of the very concept of objectivity in ethics. However, a solid foundation of the idea of objective validity for ethical discourse still requires a broad understanding of objectivity in general. Putnam proposes the notion of objectivity without objects, which holds that the concept of objectivity does not necessarily depend on the correspondence or description of any objects, be they physical objects or intangible entities. Rather, objectivity without objects holds that objective validity refers to a "body of beliefs and concepts and conceptual connections that we accept." This understanding holds that we always reason from within a body of beliefs and concepts, with a standard of correction that involves conceptual connections compatible with a coherent picture of the world being decisive for the justification of the objective validity of an ethical (or other type) sentence. Such image is based on the current state of our knowledge in several areas, although this knowledge is always conceived fallibillistically. Throughout this work, we argue that, once combined with the rejection of a fundamental fact/value dichotomy, the notion of objectivity without objects can fulfill the role of general understanding about objectivity and, therefore, contributes to a grounding project of objective validity conditions for ethical discourse. We argue that the combination of these elements allows the support of a conception of ethics centered on practical problems, which leave aside ontologically inflated considerations, so that ethical problems can be understood, in general, as problems that presuppose a time and a place. In a sense, they are problems that are always connected to a certain context. We argue that such a conception of ethical problems does not depart from general criteria of correctness and truth, allowing for a discourse capable of sustaining legitimate claims to objective validity for ethical sentences and the possibility of revision mechanisms over time due to its fallibillist aspect.