O utilitarismo multinível de John Stuart Mill: uma resposta para a objeção da injustiça e exigência

Abstract

The following dissertation has the objective of presenting a defense to utilitarianism regarding the accusations that it fails as a moral philosophy. Within its critics, John Rawls has popularized the debate concerning the injustice objections and the demandingness objections, affirming that The Greatest Happiness Principle (one of the axioms of utilitarian's theories) promotes undesired situations with the moral agents. Aiming at responding to such objections, firstly we present John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory. To clarify the debate, its main ideas are analyzed: Empiricism, Happiness and Pleasure, Proof, Sanctions, and the theory's concept of Injustice. Therefore, we can avert John Rawls’ critics and approach to a defense to the theory. Secondly, we consider the critics on the book A Theory of Justice. Rawls conceives utilitarianism as a theory uncapable of respecting the individuality of moral agents, since it is unequal on the distribution of happiness. Therefore, we can avert John Rawls’ critics and approach to a defense to the theory. Thirdly, we make a distinction between Act utilitarianism and Rule utilitarianism, resorting to Roger Crisp and Urmsom. The different forms of utilitarianism show different behaviors regarding its critics. The conclusion will show that utilitarianism has answers to the aforementioned problems and that it maintains its integrity as a moral philosophy.