O hedonismo qualitativo de J. S. Mill enquanto resposta à objeção perfeccionista

Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to prove that John Stuart Mill’s qualitative hedonism is a good answer to the perfectionist objection raised against benthamian hedonism. To do so, this work falls into three essential parts. First, after presenting J. Bentham’s principle of utility and theory of value, I introduce what I call the "perfectionist objection", demonstrating that Mill's qualitative hedonism arose as an attempt to overcome such an objection. Secondly, I shall discuss in detail the concepts of quality and competent judges. I do this in order to demonstrate that these two concepts, if correctly understood, enable Mill's hedonistic theory to accommodate the intuition demanded by the perfectionist objection. And last, after addressing the famous accusation that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent, I try to argue that, although reasonable, these charges can be satisfactorily answered. I conclude, finally, that the qualitative hedonism developed by John Stuart Mill is in all respects a good alternative to benthamian hedonism.