Neutralidade metaética: seus pressupostos e sua superação.

Abstract

Metaethics emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century with a distinct proposal of normative ethics: explain and clarify the concepts and statements in moral contexts. Normative ethics, on the other hand, rather than merely explain and clarify the moral concepts and statements, aims to say to an agent which is the correct conduct and what ought to be done. With the development of contemporary metaethics, it was postulated not only that metaethics is distinct, but also neutral in relation to questions related to the conduct. This work explores the arguments that support the assumption of neutrality and shows how these arguments can be surpassed. The study was made from bibliographic analysis, argumentative reconstruction and correlation between arguments of first and second moral order. We delimit three axis of inquiry: metaphysical, logical and normative. In the metaphysical axis, we investigate the dichotomy between fact and value sustained by the logical positivists; in the logical axis, we investigate the impossibility of derivation between “is” premises and “ought” conclusions; and in the normative axis, we investigate the role of metaethics itself and whether it has consequences to the moral action. In each one of these axis it was argued that the assumption of neutrality cannot be sustained in a generalized way. We conclude that metaethics it is not neutral in relation to the conduct of the agent and that it plays an important role in relation to the discussions of moral theory and practice.