Ficções regulativas, psicologia do erro e a questão dos valores em Nietzsche.

Abstract

This research main objective is to expose some perspectivist articulation of knowledge, it’s epistemological and ethical implications of Nietzsche’s late period thinking from a genealogical point of view. We shall demonstrate the process of rationality, it’s dynamics from the regulative fictions notion and the author’s criticism about the psychology of the error, based on his description of reactive feelings. So we’re explaining how Nietzsche articulate this critics in order to, later on, achieve his philosophical emancipation. We will also explore some aspects of Kant’s moral psychology and some nuances of the description of moral feelings by Rée in order to present Nietzsche’s psychology itself and its protagonism to the creation of new values. Three sections of the problems to be faced will be explored: 1°) Is the rational (philosophical and scientific) knowledge in the base of the construction of moral, that is, it’s derivated from the last one?; 2°) Is it possible to assign to Nietzsche any kind of apriorism after analyzing Nietzsche’s perspectivism facing possible proximities and distances from Kant’s legacy?; 3°) The Psychology forged by Nietzsche is condition of possibility for the criation of afirmative values? We will articulate this investigation starting form this questions. We will aim to revisit Nietzsche’s thinking - in line with some interests of contemporary philosophy - and demonstrate it’s relevance as a theoretical basis is still assured in the contemporary scenario, not just by the negative criticism, but by the positive constructive contributions as well. In order to do so, we will emphasize the narrow bond of the perspectivism in he’s philosophy and psychology, highlighting it’s importance for the creation of new values, what implies sort of an affirmative conclusion, result of the possible intersection amongs art, ethics, error and perspectivism.