O problema da motivação moral em David Hume: entre as paixões e a razão.

Abstract

This dissertation aims to inquiry the role (function) of passion and reason, as well as the relationship that both play in Hume's moral motivation. This analysis will allow to confirm the thesis, that although the moral motivation should be based on the impulse of passion and desire and that Hume put the limit on the functions of reason to indirect influence for the action, there is no uniformity in saying that this position of Hume could be self-evident. Nevertheless, when we act, we also deliberate, this is, we evaluate and we judge. There seems to be not so obvious that the reason does not participate in anything there. In other words, we want to verify if the reason indeed plays absolutely no role in regard to the moral motivation. This involves the analyses and the clarification of the meaning of the term "motivation" by Hume. To do this, first we analyze the Treatise of Human Nature, with emphasis on the most important arguments presented to this discussion, especially those from Books II and III. Finally, we analyze three possible "readings" of the Humean theory of motivation, that will assist us to a better understanding of this problem.