A teoria da justiça utilitarista de John Stuart Mill

Abstract

This work intents to solve some incongruences in the concept of justice in John Stuart Mill’ utilitarianism. We will analyze the question regarding the possibility that justice itself remains as an organization of imperative rules, even though it is not the last place for moral judgment. The author emphasized the importance of this concept by establishing dialogues with the tradition, especially the preceding contractualist doctrine. He intended to eliminate any practical gaps left behind by the tradition, against the liberalism issue and the industrialist development of his time. For utilitarian purposes justice takes the idea of impartiality as basic criterion: the most elevated of judicial virtues. Based on this point, we can observe Mill’s way of valuing the importance of impartiality in public scope for the other rules of justice mechanism, which are more imperative. Another relevant point is the fact that the English utilitarian has not hesitated over the called naturalistic fallacy, recurring accusation since the beginning of the 20st century. It is crucial for his theory of justice, as far as he enlightens the conceptual elements that describe and prescribe values of moral background. We will demonstrate that some of these concepts, for liberal purposes, are both facts and values of political communities. Mill doesn’t make a detailed description of human race neither of the natural world mechanism to intuit from that the obligation of justice elementary rules straight afterwards from its origin. The grounds of justice and the binding force of justice aren’t necessarily entangled. He recognized the feelings of justice as free from moral values, but with the capacity to value due to their connection to the principle of utility. The rules of justice are covered with moral value when passing by social expediency in large sense, which is linked to the well-being of all involved. The idea of justice is therefore bound to the commandments of liberal-democracy which Mill advocated. Liberty and equality are principles attached to the principle of utility. The recognition of an ultimate principle of moral doesn’t obliterate the others, which are secondary. The concept of democracy is essential, not only for being a claim in theories of justice that succeed Mill but also because it pictures the connection between utilitarian justice and practical ethic issues with some precision. The justice is covered with a very important role in the practical point of view: it is the most valuable record of our most demanding moral feelings regarding to public well-being.